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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter is before this court on appeal from an order 
entered on January 15, 1999, on the parties' cross motions 
for summary judgment in the district court in this tax 
refund case. The district court entered the order in 
accordance with its accompanying memorandum opinion. 
The district court had jurisdiction under I.R.C.S 7422(a) 
and 28 U.S.C. S 1346(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise plenary review on this appeal, 
which involves only legal conclusions. See ACM Partnership 
v. Comissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 119 S.Ct. 1251 (1999). 
 
The case arises out of the interplay between state and 
federal law and involves the application of the ten percent 
tax imposed by I.R.C. S 72(t) on a taxpayer on a nonperiodic 
distribution constituting an early withdrawal from a 
qualified I.R.C. S 401(a) retirement plan. The germane facts 
are not in dispute.1 In 1974, the Commonwealth of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While William T. Kute and Francis M. Kute, his wife, are the taxpayers 
and all income tax returns and proceedings involved here have been 
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Pennsylvania enacted the State Employees' Retirement 
Code (Retirement Code), 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.SS 5101- 
5956 (West 1990), which continued the earlier established 
State Employees' Retirement System (Retirement System) 
and the State Employees' Retirement Fund (Fund). See id. 
SS 5102, 5932. A Board of Directors (Retirement Board) 
administers the Retirement System and the Fund. See id. 
SS 5901-5931. The Retirement Board has the authority to 
adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the uniform 
administration of the system. See id. S 5902(h). 
 
In April 1987, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), Kute's 
bargaining agent, initiated collective bargaining procedures 
with the Commonwealth to obtain a successor agreement to 
its contract effective for 1986 through 1988. Inasmuch as 
the negotiations reached an impasse, the FOP invoked the 
binding arbitration provisions of 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 217.4(a) (West 1992). On February 17, 1988, the 
arbitration panel awarded a change in pension benefits to 
Pennsylvania state troopers with at least 20 years of service 
who retire on or after July 1, 1989, eliminating any 
requirement that a trooper attain a specific age before 
retiring. The award further provided that in lieu of the 
standard single life annuity provided under 71 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 5702(a)(1), a trooper retiring after at least 20 
years of service was entitled to receive an annuity of 50% 
of his highest yearly salary and that a trooper retiring after 
at least 25 years of service was entitled to receive an 
annuity of 75% of his highest yearly salary. The award also 
provided that if a court invalidated the pension benefit 
increase it would be replaced by a $1,000 pay increase with 
appropriate adjustments to reflect rank differential 
provisions. The parties refer to the award as the DiLauro 
Award in recognition of the chairperson of the arbitration 
panel. 
 
The Commonwealth judicially challenged the DiLauro 
Award on the ground that 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 5955 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
joint, as a matter of convenience we refer to William T. Kute as the sole 
taxpayer. We note that the complaint recites that Kute's wife's name is 
"Frances." Nevertheless, we refer to her as "Francis" in accordance with 
the caption used in the district court pleadings in this case. 
 
                                3 
  
barred collective bargaining over pension benefits. The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, upheld the 
award. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. State 
Conference of State Police Lodges of the Fraternal Order of 
Police, 575 A.2d 94, 97 (Pa. 1990) ("Fraternal Order of 
Police"). In particular, the court held that the Retirement 
Code "prohibits only collective bargaining agreements from 
determining pension rights" but "does not prohibit 
bargaining over pension benefits [nor] pension benefits from 
being affected by arbitration awards." Id. at 96-97. The 
court further concluded that the award was "a mandate to 
the legislature to enact whatever legislation [was] necessary 
to implement or fund the arbitration award." Id. at 97. 
 
In response to Fraternal Order of Police, the Retirement 
Board voted to implement the DiLauro Award as follows: 
 
       The awarded benefits of 50% of the highest year's 
       salary after 20 years of service or 75% of the highest 
       year's salary after 25 years of service shall be inserted 
       into the Retirement Code structure in lieu of the 
       standard single life annuity for purposes of calculating 
       a withdrawal or superannuation annuity under Section 
       5702(a)(1). 
 
The resolution further provided that "[a]ll other [Retirement] 
Code benefits remain in full force and effect and all optional 
benefit payment plans . . . remain in effect." 
 
The legislature then amended section 5955, effective 
August 5, 1991, to provide in relevant part: 
 
       Regardless of any other provision of law, pension rights 
       of State employees shall be determined solely by this 
       part or any amendment thereto, and no collective 
       bargaining agreement nor any arbitration award 
       between the Commonwealth and its employees or their 
       collective bargaining representatives shall be construed 
       to change any of the provisions herein, to require the 
       [Retirement Board] to administer pension or retirement 
       benefits not set forth in this part, or otherwise require 
       action by any other government body pertaining to 
       pension or retirement benefits or rights of State 
       employees. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any pension 
       or retirement benefits or rights previously so established 
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       by or as a result of an arbitration award shall remain 
       in effect after the expiration of the current collective 
       bargaining agreement between the State employees so 
       affected and the Commonwealth. 
 
71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5955 (West Supp. 1999) 
(emphasis added). In 1992, after nearly 30 years of service 
as a state trooper, Kute retired at the age of 51 years, and 
became eligible to receive retirement benefits. 
 
Kute elected an alternative annuity option (Option 4) 
under 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5705(a)(4)(iii), which was 
the actuarial equivalent of the maximum single life annuity 
provided by section 5702. Under Option 4, a portion of the 
retirement benefit (not in excess of the total accumulated 
deductions standing to the member's credit) may be paid as 
a lump sum, and the balance of the present value of the 
maximum single life annuity is paid as an annuity. 
Consequently, Kute received a monthly retirement benefit of 
$3,132.42 and a one-time payment of $49,607.13, as well 
as post-termination interest of $385.20. The $49,607.13 
payment was composed of nontaxable member 
contributions of $13,593.94, taxable member contributions 
of $19,079.34, and interest on the contributions of 
$16,933.90. The ten percent tax on a portion of the 
payment of $49,607.13 is at issue here. 
 
On his 1992 federal income tax return Kute reported and 
paid the ten percent additional tax in the amount of $3,700 
under I.R.C. S 72(t), attributable to the distribution of 
$36,998 in taxable member contributions and interest. 
Kute then filed an administrative claim for refund of the 
additional tax. The IRS disallowed the claim, and Kute then 
brought this timely suit for refund.2 
 
The parties thereafter submitted a stipulation of 
uncontested material facts and exhibits and served and 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The exhibits 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In its brief, the government points out that the sum of the taxable 
member contributions of $19,079.34 and interest of $16,933.90 was only 
$36,013.24. We also note that there seem to be some other de minimus 
numerical discrepancies in the numbers involved. No further mention of 
these problems appears in the briefs and thus we do not deal with them. 
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included a declaration of Dale Everhart, Assistant Executive 
Director of the Retirement System, setting forth that the 
IRS has treated the Retirement System as a qualified plan 
under I.R.C. S 401(a) since at least 1982 and that because 
the IRS has treated the Retirement System as a qualified 
plan, the Retirement System had not requested a 
determination letter from the IRS regarding its status as a 
qualified plan. Kute does not contest this point on this 
appeal. 
 
Kute argued in the district court that I.R.C. S 72(t) did 
not apply to his lump sum one-time distribution. In this 
regard, he contended that the section applies only to 
distributions from "qualified plans" under I.R.C. S 401(a), so 
that in his view the tax was not applicable as his 
distribution came from the DiLauro Award rather than from 
the Retirement System. The government argued that the 
payment fell within I.R.C. S 72(t) as it was from a qualified 
plan and resulted from Kute's election of an alternative 
annuity option provided in the Retirement Code. 
 
The district court granted the government's motion for 
summary judgment, holding that I.R.C. S 72(t) applied to 
the distribution. The court rejected Kute's assertion that 
the arbitration award created a benefit distinct from the 
Commonwealth's qualified pension plan. The district court 
held that the DiLauro Award was integrated into the 
Commonwealth's qualified pension plan. It pointed out that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had determined that the 
arbitration board had the authority to issue an award 
affecting police retirement benefits and that the award was 
"a mandate to the legislature to enact whatever legislation 
[was] necessary to implement or fund the arbitration 
award." The district court further noted that the legislature 
had recognized the award when it amended section 5955 of 
the Retirement Code prospectively to prohibit arbitration 
awards from amending the Retirement Code by including 
language stating that "any pension or retirement benefits or 
rights previously so established by or as a result of an 
arbitration award shall remain in effect after the expiration 
of the current collective bargaining agreement between the 
State employees so affected and the Commonwealth." 71 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5955. 
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The district court concluded that, in upholding the 
DiLauro Award, "the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
determined that pension benefits under the Retirement 
Code could be modified by an arbitration award governing 
the contract between the Commonwealth and the state 
police." The court further observed that "[p]ursuant to the 
terms of the [Retirement] Board resolution, the increased 
pension benefits were `inserted' into the Retirement Code." 
The court also noted that Kute's lump sum payment was 
made pursuant to an option provided under the Retirement 
Code. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5705(a)(4)(iii). 
 
The court rejected Kute's argument that his retirement 
payments must be allocated between amounts received 
under the arbitration award and amounts received under 
the Retirement Code, as it concluded that Pennsylvania 
State Troopers Ass'n v. Pennsylvania State Employees' 
Retirement Board, 677 A.2d 1329, 1330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1996), alloc. denied, 689 A.2d 237 (Pa. 1997), prohibited 
such a result. The court determined that, under that 
decision, the arbitration award and formulas replaced the 
other benefits to state troopers under the Retirement Code 




On this appeal, Kute summarizes his argument as 
follows. While he recognizes that the Retirement System is 
treated as a qualified retirement plan under I.R.C. S 401(a), 
he contends that his lump sum pension benefit was not 
attributable to that system, but rather was derived from the 
DiLauro Award, which eliminated any age requirement for 
pension eligibility and provided that a trooper with 20 years 
of service was eligible for a pension benefit in an amount 
equal to 50% of his highest year's salary, and that a 
trooper, such as Kute, retiring with 25 years of service was 
eligible for an annuity equal to 75% of his highest year's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The district court also rejected Kute's assertion that the payments at 
issue did not flow from a qualified plan because their source was the 
State Police benefit account established by 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 5936, rather than the Retirement Fund itself. Kute does not challenge 
this holding on this appeal. 
 
                                7 
  
salary. The award further provided that should the pension 
increase be judicially overturned, it would be replaced by 
an across-the-board pay increase of $1,000. This award4 
affected Kute's annual pension amount, the timing of when 
that amount is due, and the timing and amount of the 
return of his contributions. As such, the pension benefits 
were derived from the DiLauro Award rather than from the 
Retirement System. The Retirement Code makes no 
reference to the pension benefit under which he retired. 
While those benefits were inserted into the Retirement 
Code's structure for ease of administration, the award as 
opposed to the Retirement Code established them. 
Moreover, the legislature never amended the Retirement 
Code to add the benefits. Thus, the district court, in Kute's 
view, erred in determining that the lump sum amount was 
taxable under I.R.C. S 72(t). 
 
As we have indicated, we are concerned here with a 
qualified pension plan under I.R.C. S 401(a). Under I.R.C. 
S 402(a)(1) (now I.R.C. S 402(a)), an amount distributed is 
taxable to the distributee in the year in which it is 
distributed under I.R.C. S 72. I.R.C. S 72(a) provides that in 
general gross income includes any amount received as an 
annuity, but I.R.C. S 72(b) excludes amounts attributable to 
the taxpayer's investment in the contract. While a plan can 
seek an advance determination from the IRS that it is 
qualified under I.R.C. S 401(a), it is not required to do so. 
See Cornell-Young Co. v. United States, 469 F.2d 1318, 
1320 (5th Cir. 1972). In this case, as we have indicated, the 
Commonwealth has not sought a determination that the 
plan is qualified but no one has challenged that it has that 
status. While we need not set forth in detail the additional 
tax implications of a plan being qualified, we do point out 
that a qualified plan gives employees the benefit of deferring 
taxes until when they receive distributions from the plan. 
 
There are, however, limitations on the tax advantages of 
an I.R.C. S 401(a) plan intended to discourage early 
withdrawals. In particular, as effective in 1992, and as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In his brief Kute indicates that the "pension benefit" had these 
consequences, br. at 10, but we believe he is referring to the DiLauro 
Award. 
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germane here, I.R.C. S 72(t)(1) provided that the tax on any 
amount includable in gross income received from a 
qualified plan shall be increased by an amount equal to ten 
percent of that amount, except for distributions made on or 
after the date on which the employee attains age 59. There 
is, however, a restriction on the imposition of the additional 
tax, as the tax does not apply to part of a series of 
substantially equal periodic payments (not less frequently 
than annually) made for the life or life expectancy of the 
employee. See I.R.C. S 72(t)(2)(A)(iv). Kute, of course, began 
receiving the monthly payment long before he reached 59 
years of age, but by reason of I.R.C. 72(t)(2)(A)(iv), his 
monthly payments have not been subject to the additional 
tax. 
 
The lump sum payment, however, is another matter. As 
we have stated, Kute concedes that the plan is qualified. 
Moreover, he does not contend that an exception to the 
requirement for the additional tax is applicable. Instead, he 
contends that the distribution, rather than being from a 
qualified plan, was attributable to the DiLauro award so 
that I.R.C. S 72(t) was simply not applicable to it. 
 
The district court rejected that argument and so do we as 
it does not conform to the realities of the situation. See, 
e.g., Geftman v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 
1998). In Fraternal Order of Police the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that the pension benefits due to state 
troopers could be modified by an arbitration award. See 
575 A.2d at 96-97. Then the Retirement Board, pursuant to 
its authority to adopt rules and regulations, 71 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 5902(h), passed a resolution on September 26, 
1990, to implement the award. The resolution provided that 
the increased benefits would be "inserted into the 
Retirement Code structure," and that "[a]ll other Code 
benefits remain in full force and effect and [that] all 
optional benefit payment plans . . . remain in effect." 
Moreover, the Retirement Board's resolution expressly 
inserted the DiLauro Award "into the Retirement Code 
structure." 
 
There can be no doubt that the Retirement Board had the 
authority to implement the changes it did without further 
legislative action as the Commonwealth Court in 
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Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass'n upheld the Retirement 
Board's action. See 677 A.2d at 1332. Furthermore, the 
legislature, which apparently was dissatisfied with the 
DiLauro Award, amended 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5955 to 
provide, but only prospectively, that the Retirement Code 
alone would be the source of state employees' pension 
rights. But at the same time it effectively ratified the 
DiLauro Award because amended section 5955 provides 
that "[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, any pension or 
retirement benefits or rights previously so established by or 
as a result of an arbitration award shall remain in effect 
after the expiration of the current collective bargaining 
agreement between the State employees so affected and the 
Commonwealth." 
 
Kute himself demonstrated by his actions that he 
received the lump sum payment from a qualified plan as he 
elected to obtain the benefit pursuant to Option 4 of the 
Retirement Code, which provides that an employee may 
receive a portion of his benefit in that form. Nothing in the 
DiLauro Award even mentions such an option, as the award 
dealt only with periodic payments. Overall, we are satisfied 




For the foregoing reasons the order for summary 
judgment entered January 15, 1999, will be affirmed. 
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